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Uniform Commercial Code--Major
Changes in Sales Law
By FusnamcK W. WHmrESmE, JR.*
INTRODUCTION
The 1960 Kentucky Law Journal was devoted largely to a
symposium' on the Uniform Commercial Code which became
effective in this Commonwealth on July 1, 1960. The only major
section of the Code not discussed in the symposium was Article
2 on Sales. The occasion for this article is the need for an
introductory treatment of the more important provisions of
Article 2, with emphasis upon changes in Kentucky law. Detailed
studies of changes made by Article 2 in Warranty Law2 and
Buyers' and Sellers' Remedies3 also appear in this issue.
Though Article 9 has been described as the heart of the Code,
Article 2 is half again as long4 and its coverage is vast. After all,
much has happened in the more than fifty years since the chief
statute, codifying and clarifying this branch of the law, was first
promulgated.5 In fact the initial impetus for the revised uniform
legislation in the entire commercial field came from the sales
area. In 1940 a federal sales act was proposed in Congress.
O Professor of Law, University of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky.
1 Both Winter and Spring issues, 48 Ky. L. J., 191-250, 333-429 (1960).
These articles were based upon a Short Course on the Uniform Commercial Code
held at the University of Kentucky, June 23-25, 1959, and sponsored by the
University of Kentucky, College of Law, the University of Louisville School of
Law and the Kentucky State Bar Association, with the cooperation of the Joint
Committee on Continuing Legal Education of the American Law Institute and the
American Bar Association.
2 Note, "The Uniform Commercial Code and Greater Consumer Protection
under Warranty Law", 49 Ky. L.J. 240 (1961).
- Note, "A Comparison of the Rights and Remedies of Buyers and Sellers
Under the Uniform Commercial Code and the Uniform Sales Act", 49 Ky. L.J.
270 (1961).
4 By authors count from the bill which was enacted (Senate Bill No. 169,
1958), approximately 1930 lines in the Sales article as compared with 1230 lines
in Article 9.
5 It was in 1906 that the Uniform Sales Act was first proposed for enactment
by the states by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. It was first enacted
by Arizona and Connecticut in 1907, and is now the law in thirty-seven states.
It will hereafter be abbreviated "USA" in the footnotes.
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Subsequently a Revised Uniform Sales Act for state adoption was
drafted under the auspices of the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws, which was withdrawn in
favor of the more comprehensive Uniform Commercial Code,
undertaken as a joint project of the Commissioners and the
American Law Institute.
Article 2 replaces the Uniform Sales Act, which Kentucky has
had since 1928 and which was itself largely a codification of
common law cases governing the sale of most types of personal
property. It also codifies and expands a great deal of the law of
Contracts and other applicable principles developed judicially.
In several important respects a fundamentally different approach
to the solution of problems will be found.
Criticisms have ranged from protests that the new sales
provisions depart too radically from established law7 to a belittling
of its provisions as mere duplication of the "existing uniform
statutes already adopted in an overwhelming majority of the
jurisdictions."" In addition the Code's length, complexity, and
new terminology have been noted as requiring 'learned com-
mentaries alien to our common law system . . . [and] . . . a
relitigation over the next century of the law of sales as previously
worked out by the courts . . ."0 Since the pros and cons have
already been well debated by the great masters, 10 this article will
6 Ky. Acts 1928, ch. 148, p. 481, which became Chapter 361 of Ky. Rev.
Stats, repealed by the Legislature in enacting the Uniform Commercial Code,
Ky. Acts 1958, Ch. 77, p. 214, now Ky. Rev. Stat. Ch. 355. The Uniform Com-
mercial Code will be abbreviated "UCC" in the footnotes. It has become
effective at the time of this writing in five states, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Ken-
tucky, Connecticut and New Hampshire.
7 Chief among these critics has been Professor Williston, draftsman of the
Uniform Sales Act for the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. He states that
it ".... proposes many rules which have never existed anywhere, and often adopts
unusual language". Williston, "The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Com-
mercial Code", 63 Harv. L. Rev. 561, 565 (1950). This is intended by way of
contrast to the Uniform Sales Act, which was based largely upon common law
rules and therefore did not render the law in the states adopting it radically dif-
ferent from the law in the approximately one-fourth the states which have never
adopted it.
8 Beutel, "The Proposed Uniform (?) Commercial Code," 61 Yale L.J. 334,
353 (1952).
9 Murphy, "Sellers' Remedies Under the Amended Uniform Commercial Code
in Pennsylvania," 33 Temple L.Q. 273, 292 (1960).
10 Corbin, "The Uniform Commercial Code-Sales; Should it be Enacted?"
59 Yale L.J. 821 (1950); Gilmore, "Uniform Commercial Code; A Reply to
Professor Beutel", 61 Yale L.J. 364 (1952); Williston, "The Law of Sales in the
Proposed Uniform Commercial Code", 63 Harv. L. Rev. 561 (1950); Beutel,
"The Proposed Uniform (?) Commercial Code," 61 Yale L.J. 334, 353 (1952);
(footnote continued on next page)
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leave to the readers' individual and collective judgments the
ultimate evaluation of the merits of the criticism and will instead
outline the main changes in the law.
Two-fold aspect of a sale: What is a "sale" transaction which
is the subject matter of this branch of the law? Almost all
sources-the law merchant, the common law courts, text writers,
the Uniform Sales Act,1 the Uniform Commercial Code'2-have
agreed substantially upon the classic definition of a sale as an
agreement whereby the seller transfers the general ownership
of some specific chattel to the buyer for a consideration called
the price.13 Thus, a sale has two aspects (1) the agreement and
(2) the transfer of the ownership of the thing sold. Most lawyers
will recall that the bulk of the subject matter of traditional law
school sales courses dealt primarily with the latter aspect, and
it is true that most litigation has revolved about the question of
the "property interest" or "title". This was because a determina-
tion of whether and when the title in goods had passed from seller
to buyer was controlling in regard to so many issues.14 There
were, of course, many sales questions relating to the first aspect
of the transaction, the contract or agreement. This contractual
aspect, however, was usually treated under the heading of con-
tract law rather than sales, because the principles governing the
validity and construction of sales contracts were generally the
same as for other contracts. It is primarily the highlights or
differences in approach in these two aspects with which this
paper is concerned.
The main features of Article 2 are (1) a lessening of the
importance of the concept of title in favor of a narrow issue
(footnote continued from preceding page)
Hall, "Article 2-Sales-From Status to Contract?" 1952 Wis. L. Rev. 209; Latty,
"Sales and Title and the Proposed Commercial Code", 16 L. & C. P. 3 (1951);
Rabel, "The Sales Law in the Proposed Commercial Code", 17 U. of Chi. L. Rev.
427 (1950); Waite, "The Sales Law in the Proposed Commercial Code", 48
Mich. L. Rev. 603 (1950).
" U.S.A. § 1 (2).
12 §2-106(1). A sale, as under the Sales Act, is defined to consist in the
transfer of title from the seller to the buyer for a price. The language, "contract
for" may include either a present sale or a contract to sell goods in the future.
13Vold, Sales §3(2d. ed. 1959). A sale is "a transmutation of property
from one man to another in consideration of some price or recompense in value!".
46 Am. Jur. Sales §2 (1943).
'4 See infra, text at footnotes 37-42. The words title (USA, §23) and
"property interest" (USA §17, ffg.) are for practical purposes interchangeable.
Braucher & Sutherland, "Commercial Transactions: Text, Forms, Statutes', 23
(1958).
1960]
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approach which details specific legal consequences for different
factual situations, and (2) a departure from many accepted
principles of contract law in recognition of actual business
practices in modem day sales transactions. In addition, there is a
substitution of much new terminology, which is based upon the
language used by business men instead of the legal terms with
which lawyers and courts have become accustomed to express
their conclusions. There is also an important distinction between
the casual sale between two individuals and sales by and between
"merchants" as that word is defined in the article. Each of these
principal changes requires special detailed treatment to follow.
Importance of definitions: The first job faced by the practi-
tioner in respect to this new statute is acquiring the technique of
finding his way around the whole statute. Although the sales
article as a unit complete in itself can perhaps be better under-
stood than other parts of the Code, even it must be studied in
the light of the definitions and general principles of construction
found in the introductory Article 1,13 whose provisions have
relevance throughout the remaining nine articles. Article 2 also
has its own list of definitions as well as an index of definitions to
be found in other sections of that article.16 These, of course, are
applicable only within Article 2. Furthermore, the comments
to each section contain a list of cross-references as well as
"definitional cross-references" to other sections, which must fre-
quently be examined to determine the exact meaning of words.
Taken together, there is a maze of provisions, in which the
practitioner under the Code must gradually learn to find his way
about.
It is little wonder then that critics have pointed out that the
Code is difficult because it is complex. The fact remains that
precise and accurate definitions with qualifications and supple-
mentary definitions are absolutely necessary to adequate coverage
of such a vast and sprawling body of case and statutory law.
Lest we give it up as a bad endeavor too soon, I suggest two steps
15 § §1-201 through 1-208. Especially relevant to Article 2 are the
following definitions: §1-201(9) defining "buyer in ordinary course of business"-
§1-201(17) defining "fungible"; §1-201(19) defining "good faith"; §1-201(26) (27
relating to "notice". §1-204, relating to action taken within a "reasonable time
and "seasonably", and §1-205, relating to "course of dealing and usage of trade",
also contain pertinent definitions.
l UCC §§2-103 through 2-107.
[Vol. 49,
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for a better initial understanding of Article 2. First, read Article
2 completely through, without the comments or explanations or
cross-references (not quite like a novel, it is true), in an' effort
to see what is covered and the plan of organization. Next, since
proof of utility is in the use, try the article as a reference work
for the answer to a specific problem. It is submitted that the
lawyer's criticisms will vanish when he sees how readily and how
completely the Code provides the answer, as contrasted with the
time spent in examination of the Sales Act and in finding the
ambiguous and conflicting court decisions.
Illustration of the labyrinth of definitions important for the
practitioner to examine, may be found in the provisions regarding
good faith and merchants. "Good faith" in the case of a
"merchant" is defined to include both "honesty in fact and the
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing
in the trade".17 This does not mean that sellers and buyers of
the non-merchant category are bound by no standards at all.
For them it is necessary to look, however, to the general defini-
tions applicable throughout the entire Code to find that "good
faith" is "honesty in fact",' 8 substantially the same as the single
definition in the Sales Act, applicable to all persons whether
merchants or not.' 9
Many legal consequences throughout Article 2 depend upon
whether the transaction is between merchants or whether the
individual buyer or seller to be affected is a non-merchant. There-
fore, it may become very important to examine the definition of
"merchant in section 2-104 as well as the types of situations
where this distinction may become controlling. Under the Code
definition, a merchant may be not only "a person who deals in
goods of the kind" involved, but also one who "otherwise by his
occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill
peculiar" to either the goods or the business practices. Comment
1 to section 2-104 states that the nature of the provision will
determine what kind of specialized knowledge will constitute
one a merchant. This may not always be easy of application, but
it will be material to the issues. The policy, based upon experi-
ence reflecting the necessity of clear rules governing transactions
17 UCC §2-104.
18 UCG §1-201(19).
19 USA §76(2).
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between professionals, is to state rules between merchants and
as against a mrchant when needed instead of simply to leave the
court to the circumstances or trade usage in each case as did the
previous statute. ° Some of these specialized rules, which appear
only in Article 2, rest upon normal practices in any type business
and with which every person engaged in business should be
familiar; a second group of rules prescribe special legal conse-
quences only where a party is a merchant with respect to the
particular type goods involved; while still a third type of rule
has reference to "reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing
in the trade", applicable to persons who are merchants under
either the "goods" or the "practices" aspect of the definition of
merchant.21
Critics of this categorization point to its novelty and the fact
that it attempts to create two separate commercial laws based
upon the type persons involved in the transaction rather than
merely upon the facts of each case. It is well to remember, how-
ever, that the classification is not really as novel as it may seem.
The early "law merchant" was a special body of rules developed
by merchants to govern dealings among themselves and was
based upon their customs and practices. The common law courts
gradually applied these rules generally to commercial transactions
affecting not only merchants but other persons. A recognition
of the fact that professionals in different trades have continued
to develop special rules of their own to meet changing business
needs, may be seen not only in the weight given trade usage and
custom, but also in the judicial limitations cutting down such
usage to proper size and area.2 2 In this respect the Code pro-
vision may be considered to make explicit what the courts have
been doing anyway by applying these specialized rules only to
knowledgeable persons in the trade and not to the casual buyer
or seller unfamiliar with the trade usage or custom. For several
limited situations the Uniform Sales Act, too, had kindred pro-
visions, distinguishing persons "in the know" from others. For
example, the warranty of merchantability is limited to goods
bought from "a seller who deals in goods of that kind or descrip-
20 UCC §2-104, Comment 1. Cf. USA §71, 45(2).
21 Id., Comment 2.
22 For an excellent discussion of limitations, i.e. reasonableness, certainty,
legality, etc., see Note, 55 Columb. L. Rev. 1192, 1198 (1955).
[Vol. 49,
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tion ";2 3 and the implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose
is recognized "when annexed by the usage of the trade."24
Furthermore, the effect of custom upon all sales transactions is
expressly recognized.25
Subject matter and scope of Article 2: Sales and contracts to
sell "goods" are what Article 2 is talking about, as was true under
the replaced statute.2  But goods are defined broadly to mean
"all things movable", avoiding use of the common law and Sales
Act term "chattels personal. 27 In addition to movable things,
section 2-105 includes within the definition of goods (1) the
unborn young of animals, (2) growing crops, and (3) things
attached to the realty pursuant to certain conditions prescribed
in section 2-107.
The sales article makes clear that transactions other than sales
of goods, e.g., sales of realty or contracts for services, are not
within its scope.28 Specifically relieved from operation of Article
2 are (1) "transactions... intended to operate only as a security
transaction", to which Article 9 would be applicable, (2) "any
statute regulating sales to consumers, farmers or other specified
classes of buyers", (3) "money in which the price is to be paid",
(4) "investment securities", to which Article 8 applies, and (5)
things in action.20 Thus, the exclusions from coverage correspond
substantially to the Uniform Sales Act. 0
Since the exclusion is for transactions intended to operate
"only" as security transactions, the article would be applicable to
the sales aspects of security transactions under which the seller
retains a security interest such as a conditional sale or a purchase
money mortgage. 31 Thus the sales aspects of such transactions
are governed by this article, whereas the security aspects would
23 USA §15(2).
24 USA §15(5).
25 USA §71.
26 UCC §2-105(1)(2); USA §5.
27 UGC §2-105(1) and USA §76.
28 UCC §2-103.
20 UCC §2-105. Although "things in action" are not defined, the example
which comes to mind (other than the articles specifically excluded, such as the
one relating to investment securities) is Commercial Paper, regulated by Article 3.
30 USA §75 read as follows:
The provisions of this act relating to contracts to sell and to
sales do not apply, unless so stated, to any transaction in the form of
a contract to sell or a sale which is intended to operate by way of
mortgage, pledge, charge, or other security.
31 Cartwright v. C.I.T. Corp., 253 Ky. 690, 70 S.W. 2d 388 (1934).
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be governed by Article 9. If the transaction is intended to
operate only as security, the Code excludes application of Article
2 even though the transaction is "in the form of an unconditional
contract to sell or present sale. .. *"32 It is not always clear
whether a given transaction is intended to be a sale or a security
transaction, since parties often disguise a security device in the
form of an absolute sale.3 3 As between the parties, courts will
look to the real intent and examine the substance rather than the
form. Thus we may still expect the same problem, with the same
principles governing its solution, to arise in the future as in the
past under the Uniform Sales Act.
The Code's preservation of certain legislation affecting con-
sumers, farmers, or special types of buyers, is consistent with its
coverage and desirable. An example of this type legislation in
Kentucky is the Retail Installment Sales Act affecting Motor
Vehicles, 34 and any future legislation in line with a national trend
for the protection of installment purchasers generally."
The exclusion only of "money in which the price is to be
paid" shows by implication that sales of money as a commodity,
e.g., foreign currency in some situations, 3 are intended to be
within the scope of article 2's coverage.
DFLVERY, TrrLE Ain RiSK
Importance of title: As attested by the volume of litigation in
Kentucky as well as in other states, with or without the Uniform
Sales Act, the great game in sales has been to find the location
of the "property interest" or the "title" to the goods as between
buyer and seller. This has been true because a great variety of
legal consequences were resolved by determination of the title
32 UCC §2-102.
33 Vold, Sales § 26 (2d. ed. 1959); Dollar v. Land, 184 F. 2d 245 (App. D.C.
1950), cert. den. 340 U.S. 884; Barker Candy Co. v. Commercial Security Co.,
93 Conn. 129, 105 A. 328 (1918); Cf. Cartwright v. C.I.T. Corp., supra note 31,
at 694.
34 Ky. Acts. 1956, ch. 105. Ky. Rev. Stat. §190:090-990, entitled "The Motor
Vehicle Retail Installment Sales Act".
35 There are excellent recent studies of such legislation. See Warren, "Regu-
lation of Finance Charges in Retail Installment Sales", 68 Yale L.J. 839 (1959);
Britton and Ulrich, "The Illinois Retail Installment Sales Act-Historical Back-
ground and Compar 4-'e Legislation", 53 Northwestern U.L.R. 137 (1958).
36 UCC §2-105, Comment 1; Richard v. American Union Bank, 253 N.Y. 166,
170 N.E. 532 (1930) ((Judicial construction of Uniform Sales Act to apply when
money is dealt in as a commodity, as in contracts to supply of foreign currency).
[Vol. 49,
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question: the risk of loss, 37 the seller's right to the purchase
price,38 the buyer's right to the goods,30 various public burdens
and responsibilities such as taxes upon the goods,40 and not least
important, the rights of third parties such as creditors or a
trustee in bankruptcy of the buyer party or seller party.4' When
title passed, title passed, and we could all go home, whatever the
specific issue. The Code aims to deemphasize the importance of
this conceptualistic approach by providing instead the legal con-
sequences for the varying factual situations. In the language of
section 2-401:
Each provision of this Article with regard to the rights,
obligations and remedies of the seller, the buyer, purchasers
or other third parties applies irrespective of title to the
goods except where the provision refers to such title.
These specific provisions appear throughout the article, some
important examples being the provisions regarding risk of loss,
42
the seller's right of action for the price,43 and the buyer's right
to obtain the goods.44 In dealing with any specific problem the
attorney must therefore look first for a Code provision determina-
tive of the issue at hand, because the specific provision may render
wholly immaterial the general rules for locating title set out in
section 2-401.
The main advantage of this new "step by step performance
or non-performance''45 approach is expected to be in the elimina-
tion of the resort to the very difficult and uncertain inquiry as to
the location of title in many situations where the contract is silent.
Though title passage has always been considered to be dependent
37 Fragano v. Long, 4 Barn & C. 219 (K.B. 1825); Troy Refining Corp. v.
Slagter Oil & Grease Co., 61 F. Supp. 869 (W.D. Ky. 1945).
8 Lott v. Delmar, 22 N.J. 229, 66 A. 2d 25 (1949) (risk of loss follows title);
Kampmann v. McInerney, 258 Wis. 482, 46 N.W. 2d 205 (1951) (title passage
gives right to action for the price under USA §68(1).).
39 Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Peters, White & Co., 283 N.Y. 97, 134 N.E. 849
(1922); Crowder v. Barnes Auto Co., 809 Ky. 623, 218 S.W. 2d 679 (1949).
40Pacific Grape Products Co. v. C.I.R., 218 F. 2d 862 (9th Cir., 1955);
C. M. Hall Lamp Co. v. United States, 201 F. 2d 465 (6th Cir., 1953).
41 Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Number Nine Coal Corp., 311 Ky. 329,
224 S.W. 2d 138 (1949); In re Browning Crane & Shovel Co., 133 F. Supp. 653
(D.C. Ohio 1955).
42 UCC §§2-509, 2-510.
43 UCC §2-709.
44 UCC §§2-502, 2-716.
45 UCC §2-401, Comment 1.
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upon the intention of the parties,40 the parties do not think in
terms of passin-, the property ownership or title. Since the
parties usually do not sufficiently indicate their intention regard-
ing passage of title, the common law and the Uniform Sales Act
provided "gap-filling rules" or presumptions regarding passage of
title in specific situations. Examination of case law under the
Uniform Sales Act shows considerable confusion in developing
the rules to be applied in given factual situations in regard to
the frequently arising questions: (1) whether or not the parties'
intention is sufflicienE to render unnecessary a resort to any of the
gap-filling rules;48 (2) if so, what is that intention?" (8) if not,
which of the different gap-filling rules in the Sales Act is to be
applied?50 These are the types of difficulties the Code has sought
to avoid.
46USA §18; Vold, Sales §24 (2d ed. 1959); Williston, Sales §261 (rev. ed.
1948); Radloff v. Bragmus, 214 Minn. 130, 7 N.W. 2d 491 (1948).47 The necessity for these gap-filling rules, or presumptions, arises from the
lack of intent of the parties in regard to the abstract concept of location of title.
Vold, Sales, §24, pp. 129, 142 (2d ed. 1959). These rules, based upon common
law decisions, are set out in USA §19 as "rules for ascertaining the intention of
the parties as to the time at which the property in the goods is to pass to the
buyer". They govern "unless a contrary intention appears", hence their descrip-
tion as "gap-filling rules",
48 See e.g. Crowder v. Barnes Automobile Co., supra note 89; Sadler Mach.
Co. v. Ohio Nat. Bank, 202 F. 2d 887 (N.D. Ohio 1952) (shown intent that title
pass prior to contemplated shipment).
49 The Uniform Sales Act, §18, after providing that title to specific goods
passes when the parties so intend, states: ". . . (2) For the purpose of ascertaining
the intention of the parties, regard shall be had to the terms of the contract, the
conduct of the parties, usages of trade and the circumstances of the case".
Although the hinging of title passage upon intention is supposed to apply only to
identified goods (infra note 89), even the issue whether the goods are to be con-
sidered identified may in the last analysis depend upon intentio 1, as in the grading
and sorting cases (infra note 50).
Language which might seem to indicate unquivocally a present sale is often
held to have a contrary result. For example, words such as "sold", "hereby sells"
are often used loosely and, taken together with other provisions, are consistent with
a contract to sell in the future. Rudy-Patrick Seed Co. v. Roseman, 284 Ia. 597,
18 N.W. 2d 347 (1944); Vold, Sales (2d ed. 1959) 139.
Delivery or payment, or both, in advance of sale, although facts evidentiary
of sale at time ofthe bargain, are not conclusive. But postponement of delivery
or payment, or both, would not prevent passage of the title under the presump-
tion of section 19, Rule 1, that title passes to specific goods in a deliverable state
at the time of the bargain. Nor would such postponement prevent title passage
based upon intention if the goods are not considered to be in a deliverable state.
50 There exists under the Sales Act first the problem of determining whether
the goods fall under the category of specific goods, to which Rules 1 and 2 of
§19 apply, or whether the goods are future or unascertained goods, to which
Rules 4 or 5 apply. One example of a situation in which difficulty is encountered
in classification appears in the cases involving the sale of an undivided shire in a
mass of goods. Hawkland, Sales and Bulk Sales 82 (1958); VoId, Sales 233
(2d ed. 1959); Pacific Grape Products Co. v. C.I.R., supra note 40.
Once it is determined that the goods are specific goods there is still the
(footnote continued on next page)
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Risk of loss or damage to goods: Let us look at the specific
issue approach in regard to risk of loss, that most frequently aris-
ing issue traditionally dependent upon locating title. The Code
makes separate provision for the situations where there is proper
performance by the parties and where there is a breach, repudia-
tion or improper performance by one of the parties.51 In the
ordinary situation involving no fault, section 2-509 sets out
detailed rules for several different factual situations, the general
effect of which is to make risk dependent upon completion of
seller's performance by delivery of possession and not upon trans-
fer of title. Of course these risk provisions are subject to contrary
agreement by the partiesr 2 The result is generally in line with
pre-existing law. 3 The risk passes to the buyer upon delivery
to the carrier in the normal type of shipment contract, whereas
in the destination type contract risk does not pass to the buyer
(footnote continued from preceding page)
problem of whether nothing remains to be done to place the goods in a deliverable
state so that under the presumption of Rule 1 of §19 title passes at the time of
the bargain, or whether on the other hand something remains to be done so that
Rule 2 applies to prevent title passage until that thing is done (and, by inference,
cause title to pass when done). One example of difficulty in making this classifica-
tion is to be found in the cases involving such further acts as weighing, measuring,
sorting, or testing. Although the English Sale of Goods Act recognized a
common law distinction making title passage turn upon whether such acts were
to be done by the seller (Sale of Goods Act, §18, Rule 3), the Uniform Sales Act
omitted this provision. In the United States it is difficult to determine definite
rules from the cases. Many cases have rejected the distinction turning upon which
party was to do the weighing or grading, and look rather to the more realistic
criterion of whether the further act is merely mechanical under definite external
standards or involves personal judgment or discretion. Radloff v. Bragmus, supra
note 46; Vold, Sales, §27, p. 155 (2d ed. 1959).
If the contract calls for future or unascertained goods to be manufactured
and shipped by carrier, Rules 4 and 5 provide alternative solutions, either of
which might reasonably be applied by a court to the same situation. Although
§19 Rule 4(2) provides that ordinarily there is an "appropriation" (passing title
to the buyer) when the seller delivers conforming goods to the carrier, §19, Rule 5,
contains language which has been interpreted to prevent title passage until
destination if the seller is to pay the freight. This has given rise to conflicting
interpretation by the cases involving shipments where freight is paid by the seller.
Some courts treat the freight payment provision as merely a price term, Lans-
downe Distillery v. Duggan's Distillers Products Corp., 192 Md. 540, 64 A. 2d
727 (1949), other courts hold that the nrovision also prevents title from passing
until destination, Meyer v. State Bd. of Equalization, 42 Cal. 2d 376, 267, P. 2d
257 (1954).
51 §2-509. Risk of Loss in the Absence of Breach; and §2-510. Effect of
Breach on Risk of Loss.
52 UCC §2-509(4).
53 Troy Refining Corp. v. Slagter Oil & Grease Co., supra note 37. Harvey
Probber, Inc. v. Kauffman, 181 Pa. Super 281, 124 A. 2d 699 (1957) (delivery to
carrier passes title to buyer along with the incidental risk of loss); Rudy-Patrick
Seed Co. v. Roseman. 234 Iowa 597. 13 N.W. 2d 347 (1944) (contract "f.o.b."
point of destination, does not pass title so as to enable buyer to maintain action
of replevin).
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until tender of delivery at destination. Reference to other sections
of the article thoroughly clarifies when the seller's performance is
complete upon shipment and when the contract is to be treated
as a destination contract.5 4 Likewise consistent in result with
pre-existing law are the rules for goods not requiring shipment
but which are transferred to the buyer while in the hands of a
third party bailee, such as a warehouseman. 5 In a third situation
involving neither the shipment contract nor goods in the hands
of a bailee, however, there is an innovation in the law. If tender
of delivery has been made but the goods are not yet received by
the buyer, the risk is made to turn upon whether or not the seller
is a "merchant". If the seller is a non-merchant the risk passes
to the buyer upon tender of delivery, but if he is a merchant it
does not pass until the buyer actually receives the goods. Why
this distinction? The drafters in comment 3 explain their under-
lying theory that a merchant prior to taking of possession by
the buyer continues control over the goods and therefore may
be expected to carry insurance.56 Elasticity in the Code definition
of "merchant"5 7 to include dealers in the kind of goods involved
as well as those who otherwise appear to have special knowledge
or skill seems to give the courts great leeway in determining
merchant status. Exactly wherein this would depart from pre-
vious law can be seen in the judicial application, regardless of
merchant status, of section 19, Rule 1, of the Uniform Sales Act,
providing that the "property" (and hence risk) passes in specific
goods to which nothing remains to be done at the time of the
bargain (unless an intention otherwise appears)."' Further, for
future or unascertained goods, the title and risk would under
previous law pass upon appropriation of such goods to the con-
tract by either party with the other's assent, regardless of seller's
merchant or non-merchant status.59
54 See §401 and §503, Comment 3, explaining that the intention is to make
the shipment type contract the normal one with the destination type the variant
one.
55 UCC §2-509(3).
56 UCC §2-509, Comment 3.
57 UCC §2-104, discussed supra in text at notes 19, 20.
58 See e.q. Harris v. Merlino, 137 N.J.L. 717, 61 A. 2d 276 (1948), (title to
specific goods in a deliverable state passed to the buyer on the fall of the
auctioneer's hammer, and from that point the risk of loss was upon the buyer
regardless of the fact that the merchant retained possession).
59 USA §19, Rule 4(a). Cf. In re Shipley Stove and Lumber Co., 29 F. Supp.
746 (E.D. Ky., 1939).
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Nor do the provisions placing risk of loss upon the party who
has breached the contract change previous law substantially,
though the approach is changed. Previous law placed the risk
upon a seller who made a non-conforming delivery 0 through a
Uniform Sales Act provision that title would not pass in such
cases. The new provision,61 without mentioning title, simply says
the risk remains upon the seller until his breach is cured or until
the buyer accepts . 2 Though relating risk to breach is a com-
pletely new provision, the Uniform Sales Act had a similar pro-
vision affecting only the kind of breach or default involving
delayed delivery by the seller, in which case risk remained upon
the seller as to any "loss which might not have occurred but for
such fault."63 The latter qualification raised troublesome questions
as to when a delay caused a particular loss. Another real change
recognizes the facts of life regarding insurance on goods. Either
party who finds himself in possession of goods which the other
party ought to have-an aggrieved seller still in possession of
conforming goods identified to the contract upon buyer's wrongful
repudiation 4 as well as an aggrieved buyer in possession of non-
conforming goods as to which he may "rightfully revoke his
acceptance"6 -may treat the risk of loss as falling upon the other
party but only "to the extent of any deficiency in his effective
insurance coverage". In this connection it should be noted that
a new provision gives the buyer an insurable interest as soon as
the goods are identified66 to the contract.6 7 Taken as a whole,
60 USA §22(1) and §19, Rule 4. §19, Rule 4, stipulates as a condition for
title passage that the goods unconditionally appropriated to the contract be "of
that description and in a deliverable state." §22(a), placing the risk upon the
buyer after delivery where the seller retains title merely for security purposes,
contemplates goods delivered "in pursuance of the contract".
61 UCC §2-510(1).
62 For seller's opportunity to cure an improper tender, see UCC §.§2-508 and
§2-510, Comment 1. Acceptance and its effect is defined in §§2-606, 2-607.6 3 USA §22(b).
64 UCC §510(3). 65 UCC §510(2).
66 Identification of goods as those to which the contract refers is as near as
the Code comes to the old replaced concept of "appropriation" of goods to the
contract under the Sales Act (see §19, Rule 4, in reference to the passing of title
to future or unascertained goods upon their appropriation to the contract).
Appropriation was really another way of saying title had nassed. Though not
defined in the statute and a troublesome concept under the case law, it was
considered to be the action of the seller or the buyer upon which, with the
consent of the other party, the property in the goods would pass. Since under
the Code, identification to the contract is a factual concept involving less than
passage of the title, consent of the other party is not required for identification
(UCC §§2-501, 2-704(1)(a)).
67 UCC §2-501.
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the changes in the incidence of risk of loss are not changes in the
result reached, but rather in the use of specific provisions for
specific facts instead of seeking to locate title, and consequently
the risk, from various other facts.
An event which occurs everyday in the commercial field can
best describe this new approach. Suppose S in Chicago is to ship
ten refrigerators to B in Lexington at a stated price, say "$2000
F.O.B. Chicago, via Midwest Trucking Lines". It is understood
that B is to pay against shipping documents, with the bill of
lading made to S's order to be endorsed to B upon payment. A
conforming shipment of the ten refrigerators described in the
contract is made by S and the refrigerators proceed on the trucks
toward Lexington but are totally destroyed en route, let us assume
without insurance. If S sues B for the purchase price, recovery
would probably be allowed under either the Code or the Uniform
Sales Act. The reasoning, however, is entirely different. Under
the Sales Act, section 63(1) allows the seller to recover the
purchase price if title has passed. Section 19, Rule 4(a), is
consistent with title passing under these facts. If goods are
destroyed, the approach is the same because section 22, relating
to risk of loss, simply makes the risk follow the title. At common
law, too, risk is dependent upon locating the title, with exceptions
not here material. Under the Code, on the contrary, the specific
issues are readily determined by referring to provisions relating
to these issues. First, there is section 2-709 which permits seller
to recover the price when conforming goods have been applied
to the contract and are lost "after risk of their loss has passed to
the buyer". Then section 2-509, which covers risk of loss in
various situations, provides that where goods are shipped by
carrier the risk passes to the buyer when the goods are "duly
delivered to the carrier", unless the contract requires delivery
at destination.68 The same result is reached although the goods
are shipped under a reservation by the seller of an interest in
the goods as security for his price, say under an order bill of
lading with payment to be made by the buyer against the
documents. 9 And for specific information as to the effect of the
68 That the normal type requires seller to deliver to the carrier at point of
shipment and not to the buyer at destination, see discussion at footnotes 54 and 87.
69 UCC §2-401(1).
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mercantile term "F.O.B.", the Code outlines the different com-
mercial uses of that term. When the term "F.O.B. [the place of
shipment]" is used, section 2-319 places upon the seller the "risk
and expense of putting the goods into the possession of the
carrier."
Rights, remedies and title: Not only risk of loss, but numerous
other specific rights and remedies are also now determined by
specific provision. For example, the seller's right to the price
of goods identified to the contract depends upon his inability
to effect a resale at a reasonable price, and his right to the price
of goods shipped in conformity with the contract but lost or
damaged, depends upon the passage of a commercially reason-
able time after risk of loss has passed to the buyer.70 Title is not
mentioned. Similarly the buyer's right to goods which have been
identified to the contract depends upon seller's insolvency and
payment of an installment of the price71 in the absence of
special circumstances under which specific performance may
be had,72 again without any mention of title.
A complete discussion of rights and remedies of buyers and
sellers, bringing out both property and contractual aspects of
sales transactions in connection with particular remedies, appears
in this issue.73 The writer views as highlights the following:
(1) For both buyer and seller, the elimination of the harshness
of the doctrine of election of remedies, which at times has oper-
ated to deny full relief;
74
(2) For both buyer and seller, the extension of existing reme-
dies arising upon the other party's insolvency;
75
(3) For both buyer and seller, the elimination of unfortunate
technicalities stemming mainly from the title approach in regard
to determination of the amount of damages, 7 and, for the seller,
provisions broadening his right of resale and the consequences of
its exercise, which may profitably be compared with the buyer's
right of "cover" ;
77
7O UCC §2-709.
71 UCC §2-502.
72 UCC §2-716.
73 See Note 3, supra.
74 UCC §§2-703, 2-711, 2-720.
75 UCC §§2-502, 2-702.
70 UCC §§2-708, 2-712.
77 UCC §§2-703, 2-706, 2-712.
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(4) For both buyer and seller, the harshness of existing con-
tract law, which sanctions in some cases a term which forces the
other party to breach without opportunity to cure, has been been
greatly alleviated;"8
(5) For both buyer and seller, a provision which permits a
reasonable testing of goods, as to which it is disputed whether
they conform to the contract terms, without being held to have
accepted or converted, as the case may be;"9
(6) Some redefinition of what constitutes breach, repudiation
and excuse, especially in regard to remedies for anticipatory re-
pudiation and in connection with installment contracts;80
(7) For the buyer, some lessening of the ease with which
waiver of the right of rejection may be found by stating the
wrong ground of rejection;s'
(8) For the buyer, elimination of some unfortunate distinc-
tions between rescission and rejection of goods, giving rise to the
necessity of manipulation of orthodox title passing doctrine;
82
(9) For the seller, a new right to identify to the contract un-
finished goods without fear of being held to have failed to miti-
gate damages.83
Also worthy of mention is the convenient listing of all the seller's
remedies and of all the buyer's remedies. 84 These listings piece
together the detailed description of remedies in the succeeding
sections and afford the reader an idea of the completeness of
the relief granted each party.
The user of the Code will also be concerned with a new
statute of limitations, which changes both the length of time
allowed for actions and when a cause of action accrues. The time
is lengthened to four years, but the action accrues upon actual
breach and not opportunity for discovery, the latter a very
important change in suits based on breach of warranty.85
78 UCC §§2-508, 2-511.
79 UCC §2-515.
80 UCC §2-609 through 2-612. Note the expression of rights in terms of
"adequate assurance of due performance" when "reasonable grounds for insecurity
arise' (§2-609).
81 UCC §2-605.
82 UCC §2-720, and cf. USA §69-2.
83 UCC §2-704.
84 UCC §2-703 (seller's remedies); §2-711 (buyer's remedies).
85 UCC §2-725.
[Vol. 49,
UNWom COM-MCtAL CODE
How Title Determined: It has been noted that other specific
Code sections may well render title passage immaterial, so that
the reader may wonder why such elaborate provisions regarding
title. A catch-all provision was considered desirable to cover any
situations for which specific provision was lacking and title might
therefore be a subject of legitimate inquiry. Further, the Code
itself contains several provisions where title is made at least in
part material. 0
Section 2-401 adopts as a general principle the rule that title
passes at the time and place at which the seller completes his
performance with reference to the physical delivery of the goods
and also clarifies this principle in respect to deliveries under
different types of shipment contracts. The main question in
shipment contracts has been whether the contract does or does
not require the seller to deliver to a particular destination, for the
answer to that question determines not only passage of title
where material but also risk of loss and other rights and duties
of the parties. The Code solution is to make the shipment type
of carriage contract the ordinary one and the destination type the
variant type, the latter requiring specific words that the goods
be tendered at destination. 7 Although the Sales Act likewise
provided that ordinarily a seller would be presumed (absent
contrary intention) to have "unconditionally appropriated" goods
to the contract upon delivery to the carrier, there was another
seemingly conflicting presumption that title was not to pass
8 8E.g. UCC §§ 326, 2-402(1), 2-403(1). Comment 1 to §2-401 states:
"... [T]his section, however, in no way intends to indicate which line
of interpretation should be followed in cases where the applicability
of "public" regulation depends upon a "sale" or upon location of
"tile" without further definition. The basic policy of this Article that
known purpose and reason should govern interpretation cannot
extend beyond the scope of its own provisions. It is therefore neces-
sary to state what a "sale" is and when title passes under this Article
in case the courts deem any public regulation to incorporate the
defined term of the "private" law.
87See especially, Comment 3 to §2-503. Tite will ordinarily pass to the
buyer upon delivery to the carrier, but if the contract requires delivery at
destination, tide passes upon delivery at destination. These provisions must be
read in connection with other provisions detailing the duties of the seller in
both the shipment and destination type contracts and also the provisions defining
the exact meaning of various mercantile terms commonly used in shipment cases.
All the provisions affecting the seller's obligation to deliver are pertinent to
tide: §2-308 relating to place of delivery. §2-309 relating to time of delivery,
§2-307 relating to whether the contract calls for a single delivery or delivery in
lots, and §2-503 specifying in detail the seller's duties in connection with tender
of delivery and §2-504 on his duties where shipment is by carrier.
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until destination if the seller was to "pay the freight or cost of
transportation to the buyer."s8 The Code Comment 3 to Section
2-503 points out that the drafters omitted the Sales Act provision
which had been interpreted to mean that seller's obligation to
pay the freight was equivalent to an agreement to deliver at the
named destination and intended instead to require a specific
agreement to obligate the seller to deliver to the destination.
Thus the Code clearly makes the seller's obligation to deliver at
destination and assume the risk until the goods arrive independent
of his obligation to pay the freight.
Although the terminology used may seem unfamiliar, the
following additional rules in Section 2-401 constitute a restate-
ment of recognized principles rather than change. Title to
goods cannot pass under a contract for sale until the existing
goods are identified to the contract.89 This continues unimpaired
the established idea that even a contract which purports to effect
a present sale of future or unascertained goods will operate only
as a contract to sell, which cannot become effective as a sale
until the goods come into existence or become ascertained. 0
Also unchanged is the Uniform Sales Act rejection of the so-
called doctrine of "potential possession" under which some
common law courts purported to effect an exception to the
requirement that the goods be in existence before there can be
a present sale, which exception was occasionally applied to
limited kinds of goods.9' The rule that title will ordinarily pass
to specific and identified goods at the time and place of con-
tracting also seems to be a restatement of time-honored sales
88 UCC §19, Rules 4(2) and 5. For cases opnosite in result but with
similar facts, either of which could have easily reached either result, title passing
at shipment point or at destination, see Secor v. Charles H. Tompkins Co., 45 A.
2d 117 (Munic. Ct. Apps. D.C., 1946), Cf. District of Columbia v. Upjohn Co.,
185 F. 2d 992 (App. D.C., 1950) and Dow Chemical Co. v. Detroit Chem.
Works, 208 Mich. 157, 175 N.W. 269 (1919).
89 UCC §2-401(1) ("title to goods cannot pass prior to their identification
to the contract"); §2-105(2) ("a purported present sale of future goods ...
operates as a contract to sell").
9oUSA §5(3) (future goods), §17 (unascertained goods). The concept of
present sale as a transfer effective upon the making of the bargain is continued in
the Code, §2-106(1) last sentence.
91 USA §5(2) was generally conceded to have abolished any remaning
potency of the common law doctrine of potential possession, and UCC §2-105(2)
does the same thing. See, however, an interesting Note, "'Potential Goods' in
Kentucky Before and After the Uniform Sales Act," 31 Ky. L.J. 185 (1943).
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law. 2 Just as familiar is the idea of divided property interests,
to the effect that the seller's retention of an interest in the goods
merely to secure the purchase price after shipment or delivery
to the buyer does not prevent the general ownership from
passing to the buyer. 3
Section 2-401 makes only one really significant change from
previous law on how title passage is determined. That change is
the substitution of the language "unless otherwise explicitly
agreed" for the language "unless a different intention appears",
the qualification to the Uniform Sales Act gap-filling rules .4 The
purpose of the more stringent requirement of a specific agreement
is to add to the certainty of application of the Code's title passing
criteria, eliminating the broad leeway under the Sales Act for
courts somehow to find an "intention otherwise" to render inap-
plicable section 19.05 Though criticized,"' the new law makes
for certainty in prediction of results by means of positive rules
instead of mere presumptions where there is no specific agree-
ment.
Mercantile terms: Closely related to, and necessary to proper
understanding of, the article's provisions regarding title and
defining the parties' rights and duties respecting delivery of the
goods and risk of loss are the precise definitions of the various
merchantile symbols used in the shipment of goods-"F.O.B.",
"F.A.S.", "C. & F.", "Ex-Ship" and other terms. 7 No comparable
9
2 UCC § 401(3) and see also §2-501(l) (a); USA §19 Rule 1. Tailing v.
Baxter, 6 B. & C. 360 (K.B., 1827); Anderson Thompson, Inc. v. Logan Grain Co.,
238 F. 2d 598 (10th Cir., 1956) (bagged seed); C. M. Hall Lamp Co. v. United
States, 201 F. 2d 465 (6th Cir., 1953) (securities).
93UCC §401(1); USA §§ 19, Rule 4(2), 20, and see Vold, Sales §5 (2d
ed., 1959).
04 UCC §401(1); USA §19 preamble.
05 UCC §501, Comment 3, states:
The provision of this section as to 'ex licit agreement' clarifies
the present confusion in the law of sales which has arisen from the
fact that under prior uniform legislation all rules of presumption with
reference to the passing of title or to appropriation (which in turn
depended upon identification) were regarded as subject to the con-
trary intention of the parties or of the party appropriating. Such
uncertainty is reduced to a minimum under this section by requiring
'explicit agreement' of theyarties before the rules of paragraphs (a),
(b) and (c) are displaced-as they would be by a term giving the
buyer to select the goods.
06 Williston, "The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code,"
63 Harv. L.R.. 561, 570 (1950).
07 UCC §§ 2-319; 2-326.
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definitions are contained in the Uniform Sales Act. The "F.O.B."
(free on board) term defined in section 2-319 will be of most
frequent concern. "F.O.B." is used in connection with a definite
place, usually either the place of shipment or destination. There
are two possible interpretations, that the F.O.B. point is intended
to be the point for passage of title, or, on the contrary, that
using the term refers only to computation of the price. The
court decisions are as likely in most jurisdictions to interpret the
F.O.B. provision one way as another, 98 although most decisions
involve other factors and contract stipulations as well as the
isolated term itself. For the sake of certainty and conformity
with prevailing business usage, Section 2-319 resolves the con-
flict by saying that F.O.B. is a "delivery term", under which
F.O.B. place of shipment places on the seller the expense and
risk of putting the goods in the carrier's posesssion 0 whereas
F.O.B. place of destination places upon the seller the risk and
expense of transportation to destination and tender there. 00
Calling F.O.B. a "delivery term" means that it is a title term
fixing the passage of title at the point named.1' 1 The section not
only generally defines the term but also states the seller's specific
delivery duties in regard to whether he must load on board the
carrier or only place the goods in the carrier's possession for
loading. Despite the fact that the literal meaning of the symbols
is "on board", the issue is resolved by requiring specific language
to place upon the seller the duty and expense of actually loading.
Only if the term F.O.B. shipment or destination contains addi-
tional language calling for "F.O.B. vessel, car or other vehicle"
(at the named place) does the seller have the additional
responsibility of loading on board; otherwise his obligation may
be satisfied by placing the goods on the loading platform or the
siding at the place specified.0 2 Contracts can now more easily be
made definite in these particulars and should be so drafted. In
fact, as comment 2 points out, failure so to specify can be
disastrous in case of reshipment contracts specifying only the
place and not the loading details. The specific definition of
98 See Notes 50 & 88 supra, and cases cited therein.
99 UCC §2-319(l).100 UCC §2-319(2). ,
101 Though "delivery term" is not defined, the connection with title becomes
apparent when §2-319 is read with §2-401.
102 UCC §2-319(3).
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results of other terms used widely in overseas shipments, such
as "F.A.S." (free alongside), "C.I.F." (cost, insurance, and
freight), "C. & F." (cost and freight), will prove equally helpful
when cases arise, although in inland areas these terms may be
less frequently encountered. Clarification in line with the better
reasoned cases should result from the provision to the effect that
"C.I.F." is a delivery term, placing title and risk upon the buyer
on shipment. Most decisions reach this conclusion, on the basis
that the insurance for the buyer's benefit controls over any con-
trary implication which might be drawn from the fact that the
price includes freight to destination.10 3 The established com-
mercial usage that in such cases the buyer is required to pay
against the documents without awaiting arrival of the goods, and
without an opportunity to inspect the goods, is recognized.104
The Code provision on the meaning of the term "no arrival,
no sale", or similar language, has the advantage of making clear
that only failure to arrive, not of the seller's own doing, will
absolve the seller of liability for damages. 0 5 The seller is excused
from damages if the failure of arrival is not attributable to his
fault, but proper shipment must be made and the goods tendered
if they do arrive. If only part of the goods arrive undamaged
it is the buyer's choice to treat the contract as avoided or to take
the unimpaired part with allowance against the price. 0 6
Sale on approval vs. sale on return: No difficulty has arisen
under the Sales Act in determining the difference between a
"sale or return" and "sale on approval type contract, for Section
19, Rule 3, makes a clear distinction in terms of legal conse-
quences. Instead the difficulty has been in determining under
which category any particular contract is to be classified.
07 If
the contract is "sale or return" the property interest passes to
the buyer party on delivery of the goods to him under the con-
tract, but the buyer has the power to return the goods and
103 Vold, Sales, §33, p. 203 (2d ed., 1959); Smith v. Marano, 267 Pa. 107,
110 Ad. 94 (1920).
104 Comment 1 to §2-319.
105 UCC §2-324(a) and Comment 1.
106 UCC §2-324(b); and see §2-613(b).
107 Provision that "This outfit is subject to 30 days free trial" held to be sale
on approval in Kennedy v. Clark, 103 Vt. 349, 154 A. 577 (1931); but provision
that ". . . We may return it [weighing machine] with or without reason at any
time within 30 days from date of arrival of the machine, instead of paying the
purchase price" held to be "on sale or return" in Columbia Weighing Machine
Co. v. Kleckner, 130 Misc. 861, 225 N.Y.S. 167 (N.Y. Supt. Ct., 1927).
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"revest" title in seller; if, on the other hand, delivery to the buyer
is "on approvar' the seller does not part with ownership during
trial but the prospective buyer may acquire ownership by
signifying his approval.
The Code does not change this basic distinction between the
two types of contracts. Instead it makes more definite the
criteria for classification, adopting the common business under-
standing that a delivery for purpose of resale is automatically
to be classified as a "sale or return", while a delivery to a consumer
for use is automatically to be classified as a "sale on approval"
(unless, in either case, as is true under most provisions of Article
2, the parties have made a specific agreement to the contrary).108
RIGHTS OF THmD PARTY PuRcaASmS AND CRimrroRs
Effects of the Code's new approach on title extend beyond
rights between buyer and seller to regulate acquisition of rights
by third parties, the creditors and purchasers of the buyer and
of the seller. The changes are far-reaching.
Third party purchasers: Section 2-403 is designed to "gather
together a series of prior uniform statutory provisions and the
case law thereunder and to state a uniform and simplified policy
on good faith purchase of goods."109 Perhaps the one statement
of policy which goes beyond any previously recognized protection
accorded to a good faith purchaser is subdivision (2), which
states:
Any entrusting of goods to a merchant who deals in goods
of that kind gives him power to transfer all rights of the
entruster to a buyer in ordinary course of business.
Note the three limitations upon the protection afforded: (1) the
buyer must buy in the ordinary course of business; (2) the
merchant he buys from must deal in goods of that kind; and (3)
the goods must have been entrusted to the merchant. The
"merchant" entrusted with possession is a merchant as defined in
Section 2-104, subject to the added qualification of the instant
section that he must also deal in that kind of goods. If, however,
the merchant does deal in the sale of that kind of goods, it does
not matter that the entrusting is for another purpose such as
108 UCC §2-326(1).
109 UCC §403, Comment. 1.
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storage or repair, functions which frequently may be within one
of the merchant's lines of business. Buyers in the ordinary course
of trade appear mainly in the purchase from inventory situation
and are defined earlier in another part of the Code 10 to exclude
buyers from pawnbrokers and buyers under circumstances falling
within the bulk sales provisions."' Consistent with this provision,
the secured transactions article recognizes that the holder of a
security interest is subject to rights of buyers of this type even
with knowledge of the fact of the security interest." 2 And a
purchaser of fungible goods, such as grain from a warehouseman,
is protected in his purchase even against the holder by negotiation
of an outstanding negotiable warehouse receipt, under a provision
in article 7 (Documents of Title).n
The provision does not radically depart from previous law
merely by protecting a bona fide purchaser from a vendor in
ordinary course against the owner of goods who has entrusted
them to the vendor for the purpose of sale. Common law
decisions as well as various Factors Acts have long given such a
purchaser protection based upon actual or apparent authority
to sell." 4 The major departure from accepted legal principle
consists rather in providing that any entrusting of possession,
whether for purpose of sale or under a bailment for storage, repair
or other purposes, will suffice. Within the limits of its operative
effect this provision is indeed a long step away from the general
rule of caveat emptor toward market overt. Conflicting policy
values of what circumstances call for protection of a bona fide
purchaser as against protection of the original owner will no
doubt be long debated." 5
In addition to deliveries under bailments, entrusting goods
with a dealer may include the buyer's leaving the seller in
possession, with the result that a second buyer from the seller
left in possession will prevail against the first buyer." 6 Section
110 UCC §1-201(9).
111 Of course the latter fall within the provisions of Article 6.
112 UCC §9-307. Under §9-307(1), however, a buyer of farm products from
a person engaged in farming is denied protection against the secured party.
113 UCC §7-205.
114 Dudley v. Lovins, 310 Ky. 491, 220 S.W. 2d 978 (1949); Bell v. Dennis,
43 N.M. 350, 93 P. 2d 1003 (1939); Barthelemess v. Cavalier, 2 Cal. App. 2d 477,
88 P. 2d 484 (1934).
115 See Vold Sales, §30 at 172-173, 181-184 (2d ed., 1959); Williston,
Sales, §346(a)(b) (rev. ed., 1948).
116 See Comment 2 to §2-403.
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25 of the Uniform Sales Act is to the same effect, protecting a
subsequent bona fide purchaser from the buyer who leaves the
goods in seller's possession, and this has been applied by Ken-
tucky decisions." 7 In this situation, in fact, the Code protection
to purchasers may be more restrictive than the Sales Act in that
the Code protects only purchasers in the ordinary course of
business from a dealer, whereas the Sales Act extends its protec-
tion much more widely to include all bona fide purchasers.1
8
Other important aspects of the bona fide purchaser problem
have also been re-thought and restated by the Code. The common
law and Sales Act principles to the effect that as a general rule
one can pass no better title to goods than he has, barring
estoppel of the original owner, and that a person in possession
under a voidable title can transfer good title to a bona fide
purchaser for value, are both continued. This is the same
distinction made by the Sales Act" 9 under which a sub-purchaser,
even though in good faith and for value, from a party in possession
with void title would lose to the original seller, whereas the sub-
purchaser would win if the party in possession had a voidable
title. The Code, enlarging the voidable title area, has resolved
conflicts in the decisions in favor of protecting the sub-purchaser
from a vendee in possession under a transaction of purchase in
each of the following situations:
(a) the transferor was deceived as to the identity of the
purchaser.1
20
(b) the delivery was in exchange for a check which is later
dishonored.
121
(c) it was agreed that the transaction was to be a 'cash
sale',122 or
(d) the delivery was procured through punishable as lar-
cenous under the criminal law."
23
117 Adldns v. Damron, 324 S.W. 2d 489 (Ky. 1959) (return to seller for
repairs is not the contemplated "continuous" possession under §25 of the Sales
Act which enables the seller to transfer good title to a subsequent purchaser).
118 "Purchaser in ordinary course of business" is defined in §1-201(9).
Buyers protected as "bona fide purchasers" under the USA, §§24 & 25, included
persons who took for "value" and in "good faith" as defined in §76.
119 USA §§23, 24.
120UCC §2-403(1)(a); Dudley v. Lovins, 310 Ky. 491, 220 S.W. 2d 978
(1949) (buyer an imposter and check forger).
121 UCC §2-403(1) (b), Dudley v. Lovins, supra Note 120.
122UCC §2-403(1)(c); Nashville Grain & Feed Co. v. American Co-op
Ass'n, 203 Ky. 458, 262 S.W. 634 (1924) (by implication).
123 UCC §2-403(1)(d), Arnett v. Cloudas, 34 Ky. (4 Dana) 299 (1836).
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In Kentucky the court decisions in at least most of the above
situations had already reached the same result, holding the
vendee had acquired a voidable title, which could be transferred
to a bona fide purchaser free of any right in the original vendor
or owner to avoid. 24
Creditors' rights: The rights of the creditors of the seller arise
mainly in two situations: (1) where the seller is left in possession
of the goods, and (2) where the seller makes a transfer subject
to the statutes governing transfers of merchandise in bulk. In
neither situation does the Code make radical changes in pre-
existing Kentucky law.
First, the Code adopts the general principle of section 26 of
the Uniform Sales Act that whether creditors of a seller left in
possession of goods after sale have any rights to enforce their
claims against the goods depends upon whether the seller's
retention of possession is fraudulent under the state law where
the goods are situated.125 It adds, however, one very important
qualification that retention of possession in good faith and current
course of trade by a merchant-seller for a commercially reasonable
time after a sale or identification is not fraudulent. Kentucky
statutory and case law has made retention of possession without
recording fraudulent against creditors as a matter of law in all
cases without discrimination as to circumstances such as type of
seller, or how long or for what purposes possession is retained.'26
The old Kentucky statute should be amended consistent with the
Code qualification.
The rights of sellers' creditors also require consideration of
bulk sales legislation, a rather detailed subject too lengthy for
this article. Suffice it to say that Article 6 of the Code on Bulk
Sales replaces Chapter 377 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes
with much more precise definition of coverage but without
substantial change in the basic law. The essence of protection
under the prevailing bulk sales statutes is that creditors of a
seller or transferor of a substantial portion of a merchant's stock
124 See Notes 120, 121, 122 and 123.
125 UCC §2-402(1).
126 KRS §378.040 provides in part:
Except as provided by KRS 864.120, any alienation of or charge upon
personal property unaccompanied by a transfer of possession . . .
shall be void as to . . . any creditor, prior to the lodging for record
such transfer or charge ....
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of merchandise may avoid the transfer as against the transferee
to the extent of their claims unless certain formalities are met.
The latter ordinarily include the listing of the creditors and
advance notice to them. Under some statutes there is also an
affirmative obligation upon the transferee to make certain that
the proceeds of the sale are applied to the debts. Kentucky's Bulk
Sales statute was of the type which did impose upon the transferee
this additional responsibility,127 and the Uniform Commercial
Code adopts the Kentucky version in this respect.'
28
Shifting to creditors of the buyer, there is special protection
in connection with the provisions regarding sale on approval and
sale or return. Section 2-326(3) deems goods to be on sale or
return where the goods are delivered for sale to a person who
"maintains a place of business at which he deals in goods of a
kind involved", resulting in protection for claims of creditors of
the person conducting the business. 129 This rule applies although
the agreement reserves title in the deliveror of such goods or uses
words like "on consignment" or "on memorandum".130 The
deliveror is, however, permitted to protect himself effectively
against creditors of the person in possession in either of three
ways: (1) compliance with an applicable law providing for
consignor's interest to be evidenced by a sign, or (2) establishing
that the person conducting the business is generally known by
his creditors to be substantially engaged in selling the goods of
others, or (3) compliance with the filing provisions of Article 9
for protection of a security interest against creditors.
131
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Special contract principles for commercial sales: Perhaps the
most significant of all the changes in Kentucky sales law are the
,extensive reforms in the orthodox legal principles relating to the
formation, effect and modification of contracts for the sale of
goods. Space limitations, again, necessitate full treatment in
127 KRS §377.040.
128 UCC §6-106. See Dorsey, "Bulk Transfers," 48 Ky. L.J. 244-250 (1959).
129 It will be recalled that the effect of a "sale or return" transaction is to
-transfer such an interest to the buyer that the buyer's creditors may reach the
.goods despite the buyer's option to return the goods if not sold, whereas if goods
are held on approval the buyer's creditors cannot reach the goods before buyer
accepts. UCC §2-326(2). See also text following note 107 supra.
136 UCC 2-326(3).131 ucc §2-326 (3) (a) (b) (c).
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another installment, but the following reforms are listed as
especially noteworthy:
(1) Abandonment of the strict common law requirement of
consideration to sustain (a) written firm offers of limited duration
by merchant buyers or sellers; 32 (b) good faith modification,
rescission or waivers of contracts for sale;' 33 and (c) written
renunciation of a claim or right as a result of breach;13 4
(2) An attack upon injustices relating to offer and acceptance
in the formation of contracts, especially in regard to manner of
acceptance of ambiguous offers, elimination of the present unfair
advantage had by the seller-offeree in making a non-conforming
shipment, as well as in beginning performance under offers for
a unilateral contract;
3 5
(3) An attack on the battle of the forms through new pro-
visions permitting valid contracts to be made despite additional
or variant terms, with differentiation depending upon whether
merchants or non-merchants are involved; 36
(4) Clarification, with added flexibility, of the rules requiring
definiteness of contractual provisions as to price,131 quantity in
terms of seller's output or buyer's requirements, 38 duration,'39
parties' options and duty to cooperate.
40
Statute of frauds: The Code continues the statute of frauds
requiring a writing to render enforceable a contract for the sale
of goods for the price of $500 or more, eliminating, however,
several injustices which had become firmly engrained through
several hundred years of judicial construction. First, the require-
ments as to the type of writing which will satisfy the statute have
been liberalized so that the writing is sufficient if it indicates
that a contract has been made even though it does not state all
its essential terms.' 4 ' Second, a new provision binds a merchant,
132 UCC §2-205.
'13 Id. §2-209.
134 Id. §1-107.
135 Id. §2-206.13131d. §2-207.
37 Id. §2-305.
138 Id. §2-306. Examination of cases like Heidelberg Brewing Co. v. E. F.
Prichard Co., 297 Ky. 788, 180 S.W. 2d 849 (1944) reveals how closely some
courts bad already come to reaching the Code's summation of result.
139 Id. §2-309.
140 Id. §2-311.
'41 Id. §2-201(1) ("." some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for
sale has been made ..
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who receives a letter of confirmation of a contract for sale, to send
within ten days a written notice of rejection of its contents or
else become bound by the contract, just as the other party is
bound.142 This eliminates the previous advantage enjoyed by the
party who did not put his offer in writing, under judicial
interpretation of the phrase in old statute, "'party to be charged",143
and is in accord with reasonable business practices of honest
merchants. Third, there is a narrowing of the effect of receipt
and acceptance of part of the goods or part payment. Under the
new provision the only part of the contract taken outside the
statute's operation by this exception is that part of the goods
actually received by the buyer or that part with respect to
which the part payment was actually made, as contrasted with
previous law under which the entire contract could be brought
outside the statute's protection by part performance of only a very
small fraction of the total.144 There is no change in the exception
relating to specially manufactured goods and no radical change
in the provision relating to admission in open court by the party
to be charged "in his pleading, testimony or otherwise"' 45 Another
formality, immediately following the statute of frauds, relates to
the rules of evidence in regard to written agreements and parol
evidence and codifies matter previously to be found in court
decisions.
46
Warranties: The reader is referred to the excellent article
in this issue which fully compares the Code provisions with
existing Kentucky law.' 47 Though largely a codification of exist-
ing law, the changes which seem most significant are: (1) the
redefinition of express and implied warranties to include war-
ranties in sales by description and by sample within the express
warranty category;'148 (2) the elimination of the "trade name"
exception to implied warranties in accord with the better reas-
oned judicial doctrine; 49 (8) the partial settlement of the privity
problem to give the buyer's family, household and guests the
142 Id. §2-201(2).
'143USA §4, WRS 861.040.
144 UCC §2-201(3) (c).
145 UCC §2-201(8) (b).
146 UCC §2-202.
147 See Note 2 supra.
148 UCC §2-313.
149 UCC §2-315, Comment 5.
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benefit of all warranties running to the buyer;'5 (4) some limits
placed upon disclaimer clauses;151 and (5) a recognition, such as
appears throughout the sales article, of the competency of the
parties to make their own agreement, consistent only with fair
play.
152
CONCLUSION
One by-product of the new law affects the drafting of sales
contracts, of purchasers' orders and suppliers' acknowledgment
forms. New, but shorter, forms may be expected. Under the step-
by-step prescription of the legal consequences of most phases of
the sales agreement, many form clauses formerly used to take
care of especially worrisome trouble spots will no longer be
necessary. Further, under the policy of freedom of the parties
to make their own agreement within reasonable limitations,
special contract stipulations should be more easily drafted to
accomplish the client's individual objectives. Kentucky lawyers
will be happy that the present law relating to auction sales, and
in fact innumerable other matters, remains substantially the same
under article 2 as before.
It is true that in some of the states adopting the Sales Act,
courts have sometimes consistently failed to cite the applicable
statutory provision, relying upon the common law for their
decisions.153 Perhaps this has been due to the habit of lawyers of
thinking in common law principles. Usually little harm has been
done by ignoring the statutory provision because the Sales Act
was largely a codification of the common law anyway. Will it
or no, this cannot happen under the Code. There are too many
departures from previous law which the attorney cannot afford
to overlook. He must know how the Code affects his case, else
it might well be the opposing attorney who brings the provision
to light-to win the case.
15o UCC §2-318.
151 UCC §2-316(1) (2).
152 UCC §2-316.
153 For example: failure to cite on particular provisions relating to standing
timber, see Johnson, "Sales-A Comparison of the Law in Washington and the
Uniform Commercial Code", 34 Wash. L. Rev. 78, 89-90 (1959); in Arkansas
during the first six years after enactment the Sales Act was cited once, in passing,
by the highest court, though there were many cases in which the court could have
cited the Act. See article, "Effect of Adoption of the Uniform Sales Act Upon
Arkansas Law," 1 Ark. L. Rev. 122 (1947).
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